

China and International Relations Graduate Research Workshop 2015

Short Abstracts and Bios of Presenters and Discussants (alphabetic)

Xiongwei CAO

Title: *“Leader’s Beliefs and China’s Conflict Behavior, 1949-2010.”*

Abstract: This paper uses the operational code analysis to examine Chinese leaders’ beliefs and compare them with other state leaders. The results show that Chinese leaders’ beliefs have experienced significant change in recent decades. The beliefs of recent Chinese leaders about the political universe and instrumental strategy are more friendly and cooperative than those of the Cold War Chinese leaders as well as average world leaders. The large-N systematic study of Chinese leaders’ beliefs and China’s use of force suggests that leaders’ belief in more cooperative instrumental strategy has decreased China’s likelihood of using force in its militarized interstate disputes from 1949 to 2010.

Bio: Xiongwei is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida. He is a former foreign affairs official in the Chinese Parliament and he came to the United States to pursue his Ph.D. degree in Security Studies in 2013.

Brian C. CHAO

Bio: Brian is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a contributing analyst on the Asia-Pacific Desk at Wikistrat Inc. He received his AB from Dartmouth and currently researches U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the rise of China and cross-Taiwan Strait relations, and naval power and geostrategy.

Hyun-Binn CHO

Title: *“Tying the Adversary’s Hands: A Model of Provocation and the Sino-India War of 1962.”*

Abstract: From the Cuban Missile Crisis to the South China Sea today, concerns of provoking an unwanted conflict during a crisis are widespread. Why might actions taken to demonstrate resolve provoke a backlash instead of leading to successful coercion and why might this lead to war between states that do not desire war? This paper advances a theory of provocation by building onto the standard crisis bargaining model. It uses game theoretic analysis and illustrates the logic through a case study on the Sino-India War of 1962.

Bio: Binn is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He received a bachelor’s degree in Government and Economics from the London School of Economics and a master’s degree from both Seoul National University and Columbia University.

H. Seung CHO

Title: *“Competing for Cooperation? US-China and East Asia’s Regime Complex, 1989-2015.”*

Abstract: What explains East Asia’s proliferating and fragmenting regime complex? I argue that US-China strategic competition for institutional power may be causing this change. The paper first provides the theoretical foundations for this argument, suggesting we need to treat international regimes as social groups and understand states to care also about institutional power. I then outline a number of competitive institutional strategies that states can employ to maximize institutional power, which in strategic sequence generates competitive regime racing dynamics and subsequent changes in East Asia’s regime complex.

Bio: Seung is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. He received his bachelor's degree in Government and Economics and master's degree in International Relations at the London School of Economics.

Avery GOLDSTEIN

Bio: Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations in the Political Science Department, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on international relations, security studies, and Chinese politics.

Jamie GRUFFYDD-JONES

Title: *"Naming, Shaming and Nationalism: International Influences on Anti-Government Activity in China."*

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that international shaming of human rights abuses in China significantly increases the amount of domestic anti-government activity in the country. However when Beijing is engaged in international disputes or anti-foreign rhetoric is high, shaming has a minimal or even negative impact on opposition activity. This finding suggests that the ability to spark change in target regimes is dependent on the strength of feelings of national identity in the general public. It also demonstrates the need to consider international dynamics in fully understanding China's domestic environment.

Bio: Jamie is a doctoral student in the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. He previously worked on diplomacy and intelligence in the British Government, and has studied and worked in China for three years.

Xiaoli GUO

Title: *"Endogenous Power, Monitoring, and Attack Decision in Civil Wars."*

Abstract: This paper applies game theory and numerical examples to explore how the combatants make attack decisions in the face of endogenous military power and monitoring from the international community. There are two major findings. One is that monitoring works through the combatants' expectation rather than implementation, and the other is that the weak could be more aggressive due to its vulnerability. A case study of the "Marshall Mission" in the second Chinese Civil War (1945-1950) is provided to illustrate the theoretical findings.

Bio: Xiaoli is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at Florida State University. She uses game theory, experiments, and statistical tests to study international relations and comparative politics, particularly regarding China.

Yue HOU

Bio: Yue is a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania. She received her Ph.D. in political science from MIT in September 2015 and her substantive interests include authoritarian institutions, ethnic politics, and business-state relations.

Eric HUNDMAN

Title: *"Xu Yanxu's Defiance of the Emperor During the Sino-French War, 1883-1895."*

Abstract: During the early phase of the Sino-French War, governor Xu Yanxu was placed in command of a portion of China's armies and charged with resisting French advances in northern Vietnam. He received two direct orders from the emperor that he chose to disobey — one through outright insubordination, and the other through reinterpretation. Existing theories of civil-military relations, military cohesion, and command struggle to explain these cases of disobedience; this chapter tests a novel theory of military disobedience rooted in commanders'

social ties. It argues that Xu judged his orders to be inappropriate in a variety of ways, and that once judged to be inappropriate, the interaction between his newly powerful position in his network of social connections and his lack of focus on the apparatus of command determined the form his disobedience took.

Bio: Eric is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. His research centers on international relations theory, military decision-making, political violence, and organizational dynamics, with a regional focus on East Asia, China, and Taiwan.

Tyler JOST

Title: *“Roots of Nuclear Détente: Explaining Restraint in China’s Nuclear Arsenal Size.”*

Abstract: During their Cold War peaks, the United States and Soviet Union possessed 31,255 and 40,723 nuclear weapons respectively. In contrast, China’s nuclear arsenal has never held more than 400—even by the most liberal estimates. Previous research has prioritized strategic culture and China’s regional power status to explain its nuclear restraint. However, as China transforms its military doctrine and transitions from a regional to major power, existing explanations should be reconsidered. To that end, this paper outlines a new theory of nuclear security environments, in which a state’s definition of nuclear utility depends upon its assessment of future conflict scenarios.

Bio: Tyler is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Harvard University. He earned a BS in International Relations and Chinese at the U.S. Military Academy and an MA in Chinese Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

Isaac B. KARDON

Title: *“Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction: China’s Law of the Sea.”*

Abstract: The PRC’s role in the creation of the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and later accession to the treaty confound reasonable expectations that states will not enter willingly enter agreements that put them at a disadvantage. After surveying theoretical claims about state commitment to international legal treaties from IR and legal scholarship, this paper [a rough draft of a dissertation chapter] explains the case as part of the broader process by which great powers seek adjustments to the “rules and rights” ordering the international system. Analysis of China’s participation in the conference to draft the treaty illuminates an ideologically- and historically-grounded PRC interest in promoting illiberal international norms. Substantively, these interests manifest as a consistent preference for “closure” of maritime space as a legal means to maximize the scope of China’s sovereign authority and limit its vulnerability to strong maritime powers.

Bio: Isaac is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Cornell University. He studies Chinese law and security, focusing on China’s practice of the law of the sea and influence on international law.

Jeehye KIM

Title: *“China’s Selective Signaling Towards Japan on the East China Sea, 1994-2014.”*

Abstract: China has engaged in both provocative and reassuring gestures towards Japan in the East China Sea, which is not explained by its increasing capabilities nor the regional security context. This paper suggests that elite cohesion is an overlooked determinant of foreign policy behavior in rising powers. A theory of selective signaling suggests that a consolidated elite would be able to mix provocations and reassurances to delay conflict. The paper uses data on to measure the extent to which underlying preferences are similar across military, government and party elites in China.

Bio: Jeehye is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Harvard University. She was born and raised in Korea, and is currently writing her dissertation in New Haven, CT.

Jooeun KIM

Title: *“Credibility in Crisis: The China-India Border Crisis and Chinese Nuclear Program.”*

Abstract: If states already have a nuclear deterrence capability through their patron allies' nuclear umbrella, why attempt, or develop an indigenous nuclear weapons program? This paper examines the reasons behind the variation in proliferation under the nuclear umbrella and argues crisis or war reveals a patron ally's credibility and ultimately the credibility of its nuclear umbrella. My theory predicts that if a patron ally opposes its protégé in a crisis or war, indicating no assistance or a conflict of interests, it results in a shift in the protégé ally's nuclear posture. This paper tests the theory by process tracing the first China-India Border Crisis in 1959-60.

Bio: Jooeun is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Her research interests include credibility in alliance management and nuclear proliferation.

Jiyoung KO

Title: *“Nationalism and Foreign Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China.”*

Abstract: Using an original online survey experiment conducted in China, I examine the effect of nationalistic sentiments on two distinct foreign policy preferences. Two findings emerged. First, nationalistic sentiments make individuals prefer an aggressive foreign policy option, but this effect is likely to be smaller under a democratic domestic institution. Second, nationalistic feelings make individuals prefer a complete success as a foreign policy outcome.

Bio: Jiyoung is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at Yale University. Her research focuses on nationalism and nuclear proliferation.

Youyi ZHANG

Title: *“Foreign Investment and Intrastate Conflict: A Spatial Analysis of China's Hydropower Investment in Myanmar.”*

Abstract: This paper offers a micro-level spatial analysis of the linkages between foreign investment, and intrastate conflicts in the China-Myanmar dyad. The main finding in the paper is that the contradictory results in the FDI-conflict literature depends on structure of inward FDI in host state. In contrast with mixed cross-national quantitative literature on the political implications of FDI, this paper offers a subnational analysis to demonstrate the causal relationship between the degree of inward foreign investment concentration and chances of intrastate conflicts. Based on spatial modeling and field interviews in China and Myanmar, this paper bridges the gap between political economy, security studies, and emerging spatial politics literature.

Bio: Youyi is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Cornell University. His research focuses on the intersection between international security and international political economy.